BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL: EVOLUÇÃO DA INDEPENDÊNCIA E ANÁLISE DA PROPOSTA DE MODIFICAÇÃO LEGISLATIVA

Abstract

This paper seeks to discuss the independence of the Central Bank of Brazil, addressing aspects of the current legislation that regulates the institution, as well as Complementary Bill (PLC) No. 19/2023, which aims to reduce the Bank's independence index. Through an exploratory study based on doctrine, legislation, and jurisprudence, a historical contextualization of the emergence of central banks will be carried out, as well as the advent of the debate on making them more autonomous so that they could pursue their objectives with less interference from the government and third parties. The work also examines the doctrinal arguments for and against the independence of central banks, the current institutional design of the Bank, and concludes with a critical analysis of the provisions of PLC No. 19/2023. In conclusion, it is inferred that the current level of independence of the Central Bank has contributed to the efficient conduct of the country's monetary policy, and that provisions of PLC No. 19/2023 can be considered a setback in relation to the institution's independence and, if approved, could interfere with the country's economic stability.